On Friday, November 20, Nvidia shares fell 14 percent and the Nasdaq fell 5.3 percent [1]. The S&P 500 and the Dow closed in correction, and the Nasdaq erased its gain for the year [2]. Anthropic, which had listed the day before in the largest share sale on record, fell 8.5 percent on its first full day of trading [1].

Most coverage asks whether the AI bubble has burst. Fikr Institute asks two questions the market did not answer before it fell: who was paying for the demand, and where were the chips going?

The Circle

In the week before the crash, three official bodies described the same mechanism. On November 16, the Congressional Research Service published a study of circular financing, in which one company gives financial support to another on the expectation that the beneficiary will buy its goods or services. It called these arrangements amplified versions of vendor financing, and said they raise corporate governance concerns [3]. The same day, Federal Reserve Governor Michael Barr said debt on the balance sheets of the seven largest AI firms was expected to exceed 800 billion dollars before the end of the year, that their obligations off the balance sheet exceeded three trillion dollars, and that the more than 100 billion dollars that cloud giants and chipmakers had invested in AI start ups was a form of circular financing [4]. On November 18, the European Central Bank said that ambitious earnings expectations for AI firms left markets vulnerable to abrupt adjustment [5].

The mechanism is simple. A chipmaker invests in an AI company. The AI company uses the money, and loans raised on the strength of it, to buy computing power. The purchases appear as sales for the chipmaker, which justify its valuation, which allows more investment. The revenue may be real. The question is how much of it would exist if the circle stopped turning.

The largest listing of the boom shows the circle at work. The Anthropic prospectus, as reported by Reuters, showed revenue of nearly 4.6 billion dollars in 2025, a net loss of 42 billion dollars, most of it an accounting charge, and plans to spend 518 billion dollars on cloud, computing and infrastructure obligations in the coming years [6]. Alongside the public offering, Anthropic raised 26 billion dollars in a private sale to cornerstone investors including Alphabet, Nvidia and AMD [7]. The companies that sell the computing power were among the buyers of the shares of a company that has committed to buy it.

The Hub

The second question concerns Singapore. Until mid 2025, Nvidia reported revenue by the billing location of its customers, noting that the end customer and shipping location may differ [8]. In that quarter, Singapore was billed more than 10 billion dollars, second only to the United States [8]. Nvidia then switched to reporting by the location of customer headquarters, and Singapore disappeared from the breakdown. According to the Financial Times, the Singapore subsidiary booked 104 billion dollars of external revenue in 2025, up 72 percent in a year and almost half of the global sales of the company [9].

Nvidia has said customers use Singapore to centralise invoicing while its products are shipped elsewhere, and that shipments to Singapore itself were insignificant [9]. But the hub is now under official scrutiny. The US Justice Department is leading a criminal investigation into Megaspeed, a Singapore cloud company and Nvidia customer, over possible violations of US export controls; the Commerce Department opened its inquiry in 2024 and requested records from Nvidia in May 2025 [10]. Megaspeed was led by Alice Huang, with whom Jensen Huang allegedly had an affair before his resignation, and whom US intelligence suspects of being a Chinese spy; China denies the allegation [11]. Singapore has barred her from reentering the country [12]. Nvidia and Megaspeed deny any wrongdoing [13]. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent asked publicly whether Nvidia knew its client, and whether it had been selling to companies that were obviously shells passing chips through [14]. California Attorney General Rob Bonta said "red flags have been raised" about the possible diversion of chips to China [15]. On November 19, House Democrats opened their own inquiry into what influence Nvidia was able to exert over the Commerce Department investigation of Megaspeed [13].

Put the circle and the hub together. Investors were asked to value a company on demand they could not fully trace: part of it financed by the sellers themselves, and part of it billed through a city whose largest local buyer is now under criminal investigation.

Where the Gulf Money Sits

The Gulf is not outside this circle. It is one of its largest sources of fresh money. MGX, the Abu Dhabi AI investor founded by Mubadala and G42 and chaired by the national security adviser, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, holds stakes in Anthropic, OpenAI and xAI. Qatar Investment Authority has invested in Anthropic and xAI, and HUMAIN, backed by the Saudi Public Investment Fund, in xAI [16]. Gulf wealth funds committed an estimated 7.5 billion dollars to earlier Anthropic rounds alone [17]. MGX aims to deploy up to 100 billion dollars a year [18].

The oil revenue of Muslim states is flowing into a system in which the suppliers finance the customers, the customers buy from the suppliers, and debt of more than 800 billion dollars and obligations of more than three trillion stand behind it [4]. When such a circle stops, losses fall on those who came in last and hold the longest. Sovereign funds that buy at the peak to win influence are often both.

There is a further cost. Islamic economic thought forbids interest and warns against sales built on excessive uncertainty, where the buyer cannot know what he is truly buying. A boom carried on hundreds of billions in interest bearing debt, with demand that regulators themselves say is hard to trace, is the kind of market those principles were written to avoid.

Coordination is not claimed here, and the arrangements described are legal unless proven otherwise. Convergence is documented: suppliers investing in customers that buy from them, cornerstone investors who are also suppliers, and a billing hub that accounted for nearly half of sales while its largest local customer faced a criminal probe [3][7][9][10]. Exploitation is possible to measure: every dollar of Gulf capital that entered at the top now carries the risk that regulators warned about in the week before the fall [4][5][17]. The precedent is 2022, when Nvidia paid 5.5 million dollars to settle charges that it had failed to tell investors that cryptocurrency mining was driving growth in its gaming revenue [15]. Then too, the question was where the demand came from.

The signs to watch are whether Nvidia answers the questions Bessent set for its board, whether charges follow in the Megaspeed case, what the House inquiry finds about the Commerce Department, whether Nvidia again discloses revenue billed through Singapore, whether AI firms cut the computing commitments that support their suppliers, and whether Gulf funds continue to lead new rounds, including the next OpenAI round, or begin to step back.

Fikr Institute judges that the crash of November 20 was not caused by a failure of the technology. It exposed a market that could not say clearly who was paying for its demand or where its most valuable product was going. The circle financed itself, the hub hid the map, and the money of Muslim states was invited in at the top. Before the next round, the question every Gulf fund should ask is the one Washington is now asking Nvidia: do you know your client?