Abstract:
In 1969 a United States exhausted by Vietnam declared that it would keep its commitments and its nuclear shield but would look to threatened nations to supply their own soldiers. In the Gulf that meant arming Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional guardians while American power stayed over the horizon. After the Soviet collapse Washington came in person, with bases in Saudi Arabia, the invasion of Iraq and a new command for Africa. In 2025 its National Security Strategy declared the era of Middle East dominance in American policy over. In late September 2026 the pattern of 1969 reappeared. Washington called off strikes on the Houthis, the Saudi defence pact with Türkiye and Pakistan produced consultations but no forces, France sent soldiers and radars to Yanbu, and Netanyahu met the UAE president in Abu Dhabi with the knowledge and approval of Washington while Israeli media reported Saudi, Qatari and other Arab officials in the room, claims Riyadh denies. This article reads the week as the return of an older design: in a multipolar world America governs the region from beyond it, through local powers it arms, approves and can restrain.
Main Article:
A great power that can no longer rule alone does not give up its reach. It rules through others.
Washington has done this before. On November 3, 1969, with the war in Vietnam draining the country, President Nixon set out the rule that would govern the next two decades: "we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense" [1]. In the Gulf, where Britain was withdrawing its forces, the doctrine took the form of the Twin Pillars. Iran and Saudi Arabia received billions of dollars in advanced American weapons and were cast as the guardians of the region, while American power stayed at sea and over the horizon [2]. In January 1980, after the first pillar fell to revolution, President Carter drew the line that remained: any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States [3].
Guardians were armed locally. The region was governed from beyond it.
The design changed only when the rival disappeared. With the Soviet Union collapsing, American forces arrived in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and stayed until 2003 [4]. In 2003 they invaded Iraq and remained for twenty three years, as Fikr Institute documented in its account of the withdrawal. In 2007 Washington created a separate military command for Africa, built around the base it had held in Djibouti since 2002 [5]. For three decades the United States did not arm guardians. It stood guard itself.
That era has been declared over in writing. The National Security Strategy of December 2025 stated that the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy, in long term planning and in daily execution, "are thankfully over," and promised partnerships in the Gulf and with Israel without decades of fruitless wars of nation building [6].
The last nine days of September show what replaces it.
On September 21 the American president called off planned strikes on the Houthis after a call with the Saudi crown prince. The Houthis then pledged not to attack American ships, "with the sole exception of the Saudi enemy" [7]. On September 22 Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye affirmed the right of the Kingdom to defend itself [8]. On September 24 the French president announced that France would send "soldiers, radar systems and defense systems" to protect the Saudi oil port of Yanbu, "not to get us involved in any conflicts" [9]. On September 25 the military chiefs of the Mecca defence pact met in Saudi Arabia. No forces or air defences were announced, and the Turkish foreign minister offered help "in certain technical areas" [10]. On September 27 Benjamin Netanyahu flew to Abu Dhabi with the director of the Mossad and his national security adviser and met the UAE president, Mohammed bin Zayed [11]. Gulf diplomatic officials told Israel Hayom that the meeting was held "with the knowledge and approval" of Washington [12]. On September 30 the last American troops leave Iraq [13].
Washington stepped back from the fight. The guards stepped forward.
The meeting in Abu Dhabi was not the beginning of this arrangement. It was its public face. During the war on Iran, Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery and Israeli personnel to the UAE, and two American ambassadors confirmed it in May [14]. The official Emirati account of the meeting spoke only of "bilateral relations" [11]. Israeli media reported much more. The public broadcaster Kan reported aircraft arriving from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco and Libya, and Ynet cited sources saying the session dealt with Iran and the Houthis, that Riyadh had asked for Israeli help against Houthi attacks and that Israel presented air defence capabilities it could provide [15]. These are reports, not established facts.
Saudi Arabia denies them. A Saudi source told Arab News that there was "no truth to the reports" of a Saudi representative at the meeting [16]. Fikr Institute neither endorses nor rejects the Israeli account. But the question it raises stands either way. Seven weeks after signing a mutual defence pact with a nuclear armed Pakistan and a NATO member Türkiye, the Kingdom is under missile fire, and what it has received from its allies is a secretariat, a secretary general and offers of technical help. The air defence already deployed in the Gulf is Israeli and French, and the umbrella over it is American. If Riyadh did send a representative to Abu Dhabi, the reason would not be hard to find. If it did not, the question of who defends the Kingdom remains unanswered by the pact that was meant to answer it.
Qatar is the harder case. Israeli media place a Qatari representative in the room, and no Qatari statement has confirmed or denied it. Qatar is the principal mediator in the talks between Washington and Tehran, and in the talks on Gaza. In September 2025 Israel struck Hamas leaders in Doha, the Qatari capital [17]. If the report is accurate, the mediator between Washington and Iran sat at an Israeli table on Iran a year after Israel bombed its capital, and the question would no longer be whether Qatar can mediate but on whose behalf.
Smaller players came to be seen. The Italian newspaper Il Foglio reported that Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the eastern Libyan forces, met Netanyahu, and flight tracking data showed his aircraft landing at the Al Bateen airport in Abu Dhabi about twenty minutes after the Israeli prime minister. A former adviser to his father said he was seeking political support for a Libyan presidential bid [18]. Israeli reports also named Morocco and Jordan. Where the patron steps back, those who want sponsorship line up before the new guard.
The timing served one more interest. Four weeks before the Israeli election of October 27, a Kan poll on September 28 showed the two blocs tied at 52 seats each, with Netanyahu preferred as prime minister by 39 percent against 38 percent for Gadi Eisenkot [19]. A visit that the Shin Bet said should have stayed secret became headline news in Israel within a day [11]. The election does not explain the regional arrangement. It explains why Netanyahu wanted it seen. One further report hangs over the trip: according to the Associated Press, citing anonymous sources, Netanyahu asked the UAE president to deny a report that Abu Dhabi had warned him about a looming Hamas attack a week before October 7. His office called the report fake news. The Emirati statement did not deny it [20].
Set 1969 beside 2026. Then, America kept its commitments and its shield and looked to Iran and Saudi Arabia to supply the manpower. Now, it keeps its navy in Hormuz, its sanctions, its tariffs and its approval, and looks to Israel, the UAE, France, Türkiye, Pakistan and a Saudi Arabia that is being asked to defend itself. Then, the guardians were armed with American weapons. Now, the Gulf is defended by Israeli interceptors and French radars placed under an American umbrella. Then, the arrangement failed when one pillar turned against its patron in 1979. That is the risk now as well: guardians chosen for their usefulness can become powers with interests of their own.
The position of Fikr Institute is that America is returning to the world before 1990. For the forty years of the Cold War, when the world had two poles, Washington did not station its armies across the Middle East. It governed it from beyond, arming regional powers to keep the region in line while its fleets stayed offshore. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended that restraint. As the rival fell apart, American troops arrived in Saudi Arabia, then in Iraq, then across the Horn of Africa and beyond, because there was no rival to stop them. That unipolar moment is over. As the world returns to many poles, America is returning to its older method: withdraw the soldiers, keep the fleets, the money, the sanctions and the approvals, and let local powers carry the weight and the risk. Israel is not replacing America in the Middle East. It is being made one of the instruments through which America governs it, alongside every smaller power that seeks its favour. The garrison leaves. The system stays, and the region pays for its own guards.
A great power that can no longer rule alone rules through others. In Abu Dhabi, the others were lining up.
References:
1. Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," November 3, 1969, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara.
2. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, "Twin Pillars Policy."
3. Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara.
4. BBC News, "US to Pull Out of Saudi Arabia," April 29, 2003.
5. US Africa Command, "About the Command," official history, United States Department of Defense.
6. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, November 2025), as quoted by The Soufan Center, "Trump National Security Strategy Pivots from the Middle East," December 10, 2025.
7. Euronews, "Yemen Houthis Pledge Not to Target US Ships After Trump Cancels Strikes," September 21, 2026.
8. Arab News, "Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkiye Condemn Houthi Attacks on Kingdom," September 22, 2026.
9. Defense News, "France to Send Military to Protect Saudi Arabia on Red Sea Oil Route, Macron Says," September 25, 2026.
10. Al Jazeera, "Pakistan, Turkiye Edge Closer Towards Joining Saudi War Against Houthis," September 25, 2026.
11. Al Jazeera, "UAE Confirms Israel PM Netanyahu Visit to Abu Dhabi," September 28, 2026.
12. Israel Hayom, "UAE Confirms Netanyahu Visit as New Details Emerge," September 28, 2026.
13. Reuters, "US Forces Exit Iraq After Two Decades, Leaving Opening for Iran," September 29, 2026.
14. The Times of Israel, "In First Official Confirmation, US Envoys Say Israel Sent Iron Dome to UAE," May 12, 2026.
15. Ynet News, "Netanyahu Held Secret Gulf Summit on Iran, Houthis in UAE, Sources Say," September 28, 2026; The Times of Israel, live blog reporting Kan, September 28, 2026.
16. Arab News, "Saudi Arabia Denies Representatives Attended Israel UAE Meeting," September 29, 2026.
17. Al Jazeera, report on the Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, September 9, 2025.
18. The New Arab, "Libya Saddam Haftar Held Secret Talks with Netanyahu in UAE," September 29, 2026.
19. The Jerusalem Post, "Israel Election Poll: Eisenkot Yashar Leads as Netanyahu, Opposition Blocs Tied at 52 Seats Each," September 28, 2026.
20. The Times of Israel, "Netanyahu Flew to UAE to Ask MBZ to Deny Giving Him Pre October 7 Warning of Hamas Attack, Sources," reporting the Associated Press, September 28, 2026.