Abstract:
Alliances are tested when the first missile falls on a city they swore to defend. On September 25, 2026, Rashad Al-Alimi, head of the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council of Yemen, called for general mobilization against the Houthis and offered amnesty to those who defect. The same day, the military chiefs of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan met in Riyadh under the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed on August 7, and discussed intelligence sharing, military coordination and the integration of defence capabilities. The backdrop is a Houthi campaign that ended the truce in July, imposed a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia, fired ballistic missiles toward Taif and Yanbu and a drone toward Makkah, and seized the Red Sea coast around Mokha in under 48 hours, with Iranian advisers in the field according to sources cited by the Associated Press. No public evidence shows the two announcements belong to one plan, and neither Pakistan nor Turkiye has announced combat in Yemen. But Pakistan once refused to join this war while pledging to defend Saudi territory and the holy sites. With a Houthi drone intercepted near Makkah, one of the conditions it named in 2015 has now been tested.

Main Article:
Alliances are tested when the first missile falls on a city they swore to defend. Until then, a defence pact is a promise. After it, the promise has to become a plan.

On September 25, 2026, two announcements came out of the region on the same day.

In Yemen, Rashad Al-Alimi, chairman of the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, called on Yemenis to "engage in general mobilization and national mobilization, to rally around their armed and security forces" [1]. He urged them to enlist through official channels and offered those who leave the Houthis a general amnesty, to be issued later "in accordance with constitutional and legal procedures" [2]. He accused the Houthis of trying to "impose a new reality by force" on fronts from Taiz and Marib to Al Hudaydah, Lahj, Hadramout and Shabwa [2].

In Riyadh, the military chiefs of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan met under the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. According to the Pakistani military, they discussed "intelligence sharing, military coordination and capability integration" [3]. Statements from the Saudi Defence Ministry and the Pakistani military condemned Houthi attacks "targeting the holy city of Makkah," along with Saudi civilian and economic infrastructure [3]. The three pledged to begin translating their commitments under the agreement into effective military cooperation [4].

One call mobilizes men. The other mobilizes states.

The treaty behind the second call is new. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan signed it in Makkah on August 7, 2026, and Pakistan said at the signing that an attack on any member would be regarded as an attack on all [5]. On August 31 their foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced a secretariat in Riyadh whose first secretary general would be Pakistani, and the agenda covered interoperability, joint exercises, joint defence production and counterterrorism [6]. Observers at the signing described the combination plainly: Pakistani nuclear capability and military experience, Turkish drones and NATO membership, and Saudi money [5].

The pact was signed in the middle of a war, and that war has since moved toward the holiest city in Islam.

The Houthis ended the de escalation phase of the Yemen war in July, fired missiles at Saudi Arabia, and on July 20 declared a maritime blockade on the kingdom, disrupting oil shipments rerouted to the Red Sea [7]. On September 24 Saudi Arabia said it intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the port of Yanbu, while the Houthis claimed strikes on a sensitive target in Riyadh and on Aramco facilities in Yanbu [8]. Eight days earlier, on September 16, the Saudi led coalition said it had intercepted a Houthi drone headed toward Makkah, a claim the Houthis rejected [9]. Yanbu is the Red Sea end of the East West pipeline, the main alternative route for Saudi oil, and the pipeline had only recently resumed after drone strikes damaged it earlier in September [8]. That route matters more while Iran conditions the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz on an end to American pressure [10].

On the ground, the war has shifted as well. On September 9 and 10 the Houthis advanced about 115 kilometres down the Red Sea coast in less than 48 hours and took the port of Mokha, near the Bab al Mandab strait [11]. Ten officials and fighters interviewed by the Associated Press, including a senior Houthi official, two regional officials and a member of the Yemeni presidential council, said advisers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had moved from planning into the field, helping with front line command, communications analysis and satellite intelligence [11]. The Iranian mission to the United Nations did not respond [11].

Tehran speaks in a different register. In a Fox News interview on September 25, President Masoud Pezeshkian said the Houthis "are responsible for their own actions" and denied that they take directions from Iran [12]. He said so while American and Iranian delegations were holding talks mediated by Qatar and Oman on ending the war, reopening Hormuz and lifting the American blockade of Iranian ports [10].

The two claims need not contradict each other. A state can advise a movement in the field and still disown its decisions at the negotiating table. But they cannot both be offered as the whole truth. The AP account rests on anonymous sources; the Iranian denial comes from an interested party in the middle of negotiations. Neither is proven. What is established is the timing: distance from the Houthis became the public position of Tehran in the same week its negotiators sought relief from American pressure.

Now return to Riyadh.

There is no public evidence that the mobilization in Yemen and the meeting in Riyadh were parts of one operational plan. Neither Pakistan nor Turkiye has announced combat operations against the Houthis. But the pieces fit. The Yemeni government has manpower and the legitimacy to fight on its own soil. Saudi Arabia has the geography, the money and the most direct stake. Its two partners bring the capabilities observers named at the signing [5]. Intelligence sharing means seeing the battlefield together. Coordination means planning together. Integration means building forces that can fight together.

The most revealing partner is Pakistan.

In April 2015, weeks after the Saudi led intervention in Yemen began, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan for fighter jets, ground troops and warships. The Pakistani parliament voted for neutrality in the Yemen conflict, while pledging to stand shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity were violated or if the holy sites of Makkah and Madinah came under threat [13]. That line drew the boundary of Pakistani involvement for a decade.

With Saudi Arabia reporting that a Houthi drone had been intercepted near Makkah on September 16, one of the conditions Pakistan named in 2015 has now been tested [9], and it was tested after Pakistan had signed a treaty that makes an attack on Saudi Arabia an attack on Pakistan.

Yet Pakistan is not acting like a state that has chosen war. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that the pact would "definitely" be activated if fighting escalated, while Field Marshal Asim Munir held several phone calls with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in the space of about ten days [14]. Pakistan deployed fighter jets to Saudi Arabia in April 2026 without entering the conflict, and it has served as a channel between Washington and Tehran [14]. Pakistan is simultaneously a guarantor of Saudi security, a line to Iran, and a state fighting its own war with Afghanistan on its western border, where it carried out ten airstrikes on September 24 [15].

That is the gap between the declared objective and the real interest. The declared objective in Riyadh is collective defence. The interest of Pakistan is to honour its treaty with Riyadh without entering a war against a movement backed by its neighbour Iran, while its own forces are already engaged on the Afghan border. Intelligence sharing, coordination and integration are the words that allow it to do both.

The decisive evidence will not come from another communique. It will come from the ground: whether Turkish or Pakistani officers establish standing coordination structures in Saudi Arabia, whether intelligence begins to reach Yemeni government forces, whether Turkish drones or electronic warfare systems appear, whether Pakistan expands training or air defence support, whether the amnesty produces measurable defections, and whether mobilization becomes a coordinated offensive.

If it does, September 25 will be remembered as the day two mobilizations began at once: one inside Yemen, and another in Riyadh. One mobilizing men. The other mobilizing states.

References:
1. Arab News. "Yemen President Calls on Yemenis to Mobilize." September 25, 2026.
2. Anadolu Agency. "Yemen Al-Alimi Promises Amnesty to Houthi Defectors, Calls for National Mobilization." September 25, 2026.
3. Reuters, as carried by Al Monitor. "Pakistani, Saudi, Turkish Chiefs Discuss Closer Military Ties." September 25, 2026.
4. Arab News. "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkiye Agree to Deepen Military, Intelligence Cooperation Amid Houthi Attacks." September 25, 2026.
5. Al Jazeera. "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye Sign Defence Deal Amid Regional Turmoil." August 7, 2026.
6. Al Jazeera. "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye Meet: What Is Next for Their Defence Pact?" August 31, 2026.
7. Al Jazeera. "Houthi Strikes in Yemen as Saudi Arabia Braces for Attacks: What We Know." August 7, 2026.
8. Associated Press, as carried by CP24. "Saudi Led Coalition Says 6 Ballistic Missiles Are Intercepted and Blames Houthi Rebels." September 24, 2026.
9. Al Jazeera. "Saudi Led Coalition Intercepts Houthi Drone Headed for Mecca." September 16, 2026.
10. Al Jazeera. "US, Iran Hold Mediated UNGA Talks on Ending War, Opening Strait of Hormuz." September 23, 2026.
11. Associated Press, as carried by The Boston Globe. Report on Iranian advisers in the Houthi advance on the Red Sea coast. September 23, 2026.
12. Middle East Eye. "Houthis Responsible for Their Own Actions, Iran Pezeshkian Says." September 25, 2026.
13. Al Jazeera. "Pakistan Parliament Backs Neutrality in Yemen Conflict." April 10, 2015.
14. Al Jazeera. "Why Pakistan Is Talking to Iran as the Houthi Saudi Fight Escalates." September 11, 2026.
15. Council on Foreign Relations. "Conflict Between Afghanistan and Pakistan." Global Conflict Tracker, 2026.